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Abstract
How does prior context influence lexical- and discourse-level processing during real-time
language comprehension? Experiment 1 examined whether the referential ambiguity introduced by
a repeated, anaphoric expression had an immediate or delayed effect on lexical and discourse
processing, using an eye-tracking while reading task. Eye-movements indicated facilitated
recognition of repeated expressions, suggesting that prior context can rapidly influence lexical
processing. However, context effects at the discourse level affected later processing, appearing in
longer regression-path durations two words after the anaphor and in greater re-reading times of the
antecedent expression. Experiments 2 and 3 explored the nature of this delay by examining the
role of the preceding context in activating relevant representations. Off-line and on-line
interpretations confirmed that relevant referents were activated following the critical context.
Nevertheless, their initial unavailability during comprehension suggests a robust temporal division
between lexical- and discourse-level processing.
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1. Introduction
The time-course of language comprehension has been a central topic in psycholinguistics.
On the one hand, language processing is often characterized as incremental and
opportunistic, rapidly incorporating various informational sources during sentence
interpretation (MacDonald, Pearlmutter, & Seidenberg, 1994; Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton,
Eberhard, & Sedivy, 1995; Elman, 2009; Sedivy, Tanenhaus, Chambers, & Carlson, 1999;
Levy, 2008). Under this framework, prior linguistic and non-linguistic context is seamlessly
incorporated into analysis of the current input, leading to a full and complete interpretation
at the earliest moments of processing. On the other hand, alternative accounts have
highlighted genuine inefficiencies in real-time comprehension (Sanford & Sturt, 2002;
Ferreira & Patson, 2007; Daneman, Lennertz, Hannon, 2007). Readers often fail to
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appreciate the presence of anomalous content or only notice it relatively late in
interpretation.
This dichotomy between immediate and delayed processing is also reflected in the equivocal
nature of empirical evidence. For example, one recent and prominent line of research in the
eye-tracking while reading literature examines the influence of prior linguistic context on
sentence processing (Rayner, Warren, Juhasz, & Liversedge, 2004; Warren & McConnell,
2007; Staub, Rayner, Pollatsek, Hyona, & Majewski, 2007; Warren, McConnell, & Rayner,
2008; Joseph, Liversedge, Blythe, White, Gathercole, & Rayner, 2008; Filik, 2008). Rayner
and colleagues (2004) compared reading times of a target theme (carrots) when it was
preceded by one of three contexts. The control condition (1a) introduced an appropriate
instrument and verb (knife, chop) acting on a theme while the implausible condition (1b)
involved an inappropriate instrument but appropriate verb (axe, chop) and the anomalous
condition (1c) involved both an inappropriate instrument and verb (pump, inflate).
(1) a. John used a knife to chop the large carrots for dinner.
b. John used an axe to chop the large carrots for dinner
c. John used a pump to inflate the large carrots for dinner.
Gaze durations on the target word were longer in the anomalous condition compared to
implausible and control ones, demonstrating that prior context can rapidly influence
subsequent interpretation. In contrast, differences between the implausible and control
conditions were evident in regression-path durations, a measure of later processing. This
delayed effect suggests that not all incongruous information has immediate effects on
comprehension.
Nevertheless, this line of work leaves open questions about how prior context influences
later interpretation. In particular, while much of everyday language comprehension involves
interpretations based on discourse models of events, the focus on anomalous sentences
introduces the possibility that eye-movements were driven by more local processes. One
possibility is that the patterns of fixation may reflect the relatedness of the lexical semantics
of content words in the sentence or the degree to which the target word (carrots) could be
predicted by the preceding material (knife, chop, axe, pump, inflate). This would be
consistent with prior studies emphasizing the rapidity of priming across related lexical items
(Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971; Seidenberg, Waters, Sanders, & Langer, 1984; Tanenhaus &
Lucas, 1987; Duffy, Morris, & Rayner, 1988; Camblin, Gordon & Swaab, 2007). A second
related possibility is that differences in the time-course of the anomalous versus implausible
conditions reflect more strategic procedures such as the ease of detecting violations (see
Staub and colleagues (2007) for an earlier discussion of this issue). Since the violations
featured in these studies consistently varied the appropriateness of the instrument and the
verb, participants could become sensitive to the likelihood of an up-coming violation shortly
after the onset of the critical sentence (“John used”) and could actively predict possible
outcomes.
Critically, the failure to distinguish between discourse versus lexical processes in the recent
studies (Rayner et al., 2004; Warren & McConnell, 2007; Joseph et al., 2008; Filik, 2008)
leaves open the possibility that early temporal effects are limited to the interpretation of
anomalous sentences and have limited generalization to the understanding of plausible
events. The goal of the current paper is to examine the time-course of context effects by
differentiating between those that occur at the discourse level from those that occur at the
lexical level. This division between word-level and higher-level interpretation has been
featured prominently in earlier empirical work (Seidenberg et al., 1984; Tanenhaus & Lucas,
1987; Morris, 1994; Hess, Foss, & Carroll, 1995; Garrod & Sanford, 1994; Gordon &
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Hendrick, 1998) as well as in recent models of eye-movements while reading such as the EZ
Reader (Pollatsek, Reichle, & Rayner, 2006; Reichle, Warren, McConnell, 2009). This
perspective stands in contrast to current theoretical accounts which tend to characterize
processes as uniformly immediate (MacDonald et al., 1994; Elman, 2009; Levy, 2008) or
late (Sanford & Sturt, 2002; Ferreira & Patson, 2007). Yet by distinguishing between
processing at various levels of representation, one may account for ways in which particular
processes are rapid while others are more delayed.
Nevertheless, isolating the precise time-course of lexical and discourse processes has been
particularly challenging for at least two reasons. First, as discussed above, critical
manipulations of lexical and discourse representations often affect interpretations at both
levels, making it difficult to discern the independent contributions of either (Rayner et al.,
2004; Warren & McConnell, 2007; Warren et al., 2008; Joseph et al., 2008; Hess et al.,
1995; Duffy, Henderson, & Morris, 1989; Morris, 1994). Attempts to tease apart discourse
and lexical contexts have often relied on manipulations that hold constant the lexical content
of critical sentences while varying qualities of the discourse representation. For example,
Morris (1994) created congruent and incongruent discourse contexts by varying the syntactic
configuration of the same content words. She found that reading times on the target word
were shorter when it was embedded in a congruent context compared to an incongruent one.
Similarly, Warren and colleagues (2008) varied the prior discourse by placing possible and
impossible sentences into real-world versus fantasy contexts (see also Nieuwland & van
Berkum (2006) and Filik (2008)). They found that regression-path durations on the target
word in an impossible sentence were longer than those in a possible sentence when both
were embedded in a real-world context, but these differences disappeared when sentences
were placed in a fantasy context.
However, while both sets of studies suggest that readers interpreted target words with
respect to constructed discourse representations and not simply local processes, the reliance
on comparisons across multiple sentences highlights another difficulty with mapping the
presence of early versus late effects onto models of comprehension: Critical manipulations
often introduce multiple dimensions to which time-course differences can be attributed. For
example, the critical sentences in Morris (1994) varied in the type of discourse context they
introduced but also varied in their syntactic complexity. Similarly, the comparisons between
real-world and fantasy contexts (Nieuwland & van Berkum, 2006; Warren et al., 2008; Filik,
2008) raises the possibility that reader’s awareness of the manipulations led to
systematically different strategies for subsequent interpretation. In the real-world context,
readers may favor a more stringent approach while in the fantasy context, they may adopt a
more permissive one. These same potential problems are also common in language studies
from the event-related potential (ERP) literature which largely rely on interpretations of
anomalous content and comparisons across different sentences (Van Berkum, Zwitserlood,
Brown, & Hagoort, 2003; Nieuwland & van Berkum, 2006; Van Berkum, Brown,
Zwitserlood, Kooijman, & Hagoort, 2005; Kuperberg, Sitnikova, Caplan, & Holcomb, 2003;
Hagoort, Hald, Bastiaansen, & Petersson, 2004). Consequently, while these studies have
often found that prior context rapidly influences subsequent interpretations, it remains
unclear what these effects indicate.
The current experiments differentiate between lexical and discourse processing by (1)
recruiting a test case where context influences both interpretations in a salient but plausible
manner and (2) comparing the timing of these effects on comprehension within a single
sentence. To address the first point, we turn to a literature which examines how
quantification highlights referents in a discourse model (Moxey & Sanford, 1993, 2000;
Sanford, Moxey, & Paterson, 1996; Moxey, 2006; Sanford, Dawydiak, & Moxey, 2007).
Moxey, Sanford, and colleagues have found that while positive quantifiers like a few
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highlight an asserted value (the reference set), negative ones like few draw attention to the
shortfall from an expected value (the complement set). To demonstrate this, Sanford and
colleagues (1996) presented participants with sentences that varied along this dimension and
asked them to interpret ambiguous anaphors like those in (2).
(2) A few/few of the football fans went to the game. They…
They found that following a few, participants interpreted the anaphors as co-referential with
the reference set (i.e., “They [the ones that went] thought it would be a good game”) while
following few, they interpreted them with respect to the complement set as well (i.e., “They
[the ones that didn’t go] watched it on TV instead”).
The focusing properties of these quantified expressions allow us to examine contextual
effects on discourse processing in a situation where interpretations are both salient and
plausible. Furthermore, the fact that this discourse manipulation minimally differs across
conditions reduces the possibility that readers would adopt distinct strategies for
interpretation. In the current experiments, we examine the representations generated by the
positive/negative pair some and only some (see Table 1). These terms are of particular
interest since they are the subject of several well-developed analyses in both the theoretical
and empirical literatures on quantification and pragmatic inference (Horn, 1989;Sperber &
Wilson, 1995;Chierchia, 2004;Breheny, Katsos, & Williams, 2006;Huang & Snedeker,
2009,in press;Grodner, Klein, Carbary, & Tanenhaus, 2010). Consistent with prior
experimental evidence (Sanford et al., 1996;Moxey, 2006;Sanford et al., 2007), traditional
semantic analysis suggests that the meaning of some specifies any quantity greater than none
while only some establishes a shortfall by also excluding all (Rooth, 1985;Horn,
1989;Krifka, 1995). Consequently, when these quantifiers are embedded in our context
sentence, we would expect the positive form to highlight the reference set (i.e., the girls who
met with the teacher) and the negative form to draw additional attention to the complement
set (i.e., the girls that didn’t meet with the teacher).
To establish an appropriate contrast for comparing the time-course of context effects, we
take advantage of methods that have separated levels of interpretation in the comprehension
of anaphoric expressions. Using an eye-tracking while reading paradigm, Ledoux, Gordon,
Camblin, and Swaab (2007) presented participants with sentences like (3).
(3) In spite of the rain Jared/Damon enjoyed the concert at which Jared met the
band.
They found that reading times following the second name (Jared) exhibited two distinct
patterns. In measures of early processing, reading times on the name were shorter when it
was preceded by the same name as compared to a new name (Damon). This first effect is an
instance of repetition priming, whereby prior exposure to a word facilitates subsequent
recognition of the same word (Traxler, Foss, Seely, Kaup, & Morris, 2000; Raney,
Therriault & Minkoff, 2000; Liversedge, Pickering, Clayes, & Branigan, 2003). Previous
research on memory and word recognition suggests that repetition priming reflects the
retrieval of salient lexical properties including the phonological/orthographic features and
word frequency (Scarborough, Cortese, & Scarborough, 1977; Forster & Davis, 1984;
Holcomb & Grainger, 2007). In contrast, in measures of later processing, Ledoux and
colleagues (2007) found that reading times during downstream regions following repeated
names were longer than those following new ones. Prior work suggests that this second
effect reflects the interference resulting from the pragmatic infelicity of using an over-
informative, repeated expression to refer to a prominent discourse referent (Almor, 1999;
Gordon & Hendrick, 1998). Together, this pattern of initial facilitation followed by later
delay provides a model for examining lexical- and discourse-level effects in a within-
sentence comparison.
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In Experiment 1, we follow this logic by using repetition priming as a benchmark of lexical
processing to which the timing of discourse processing can be compared. In the critical
sentence, we vary the referring expression (the girls vs. the boys) and predict that word
recognition should be facilitated following a repeated NP compared to a new one. However,
it is possible that the reading of these expressions may also be influenced at the discourse
level by the polarity of the quantified expression in the context sentence. In particular, when
the reference set is in focus following the positive quantifier, the mention of a repeated NP
can be directly mapped onto this single referent. In contrast, following the negative
quantifier, both the reference and complement set are in focus. Consequently, the repeated
NP could plausibly refer to both these entities. The presence of this referential ambiguity
would have the opposite effect as repetition priming and lead to slower processing of a
repeated expression compared to a new one (Ehrlich, 1980; Vonk, 1984; Garrod & Sanford,
1994; Gordon & Hendrick, 1998; Huang & Snedeker, 2009, in press). Notice that since prior
context is predicted to generate both facilitation at the lexical level and delays at the
discourse level within the same sentence, the current manipulations offer a stronger test of
early and late effects than those previously used (Hess et al., 1995; Duffy et al., 1989;
Morris, 1994; Rayner et al., 2004; Warren & McConnell, 2007; Warren et al., 2008; Joseph
et al., 2008).
Critically, the effects of referential ambiguity at the discourse level could emerge either
early or late in processing. If this ambiguity immediately affects co-referencing, then we
might expect to see evidence of a delay in discourse processing in the same early reading-
time measures and regions of text as repetition priming. On the other hand, if these
interpretative processes only emerge after initial lexical analysis, then delays of this nature




2.1.1. Participants—Forty English-speaking undergraduates from the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill participated in this study. They received either course credit or $10
for their participation.
2.1.2. Procedure—Participants sat in front of a computer screen which presented
sentences and their eye movements to these sentences were measured using an Eyelink 1000
system (SR Research). This desktop eye-tracker measured pupil location at the rate of
1000Hz and analyzed these samples with respect to fixations and saccades. Throughout the
study, the experimenter monitored the location of participants’ gaze to the items on the
screen using a second computer and ensured that the location of pupil was consistently
calibrated. Each trial began with the appearance of a fixation point, marking the location of
the first word of the up-coming passage. Once participants held a steady gaze to this point,
the experimenter initiated the appearance of these sentences. Participants were instructed to
read the passage at a natural pace and to press the space bar once they were finished. They
then saw a true/false comprehension question and made their responses by pressing the
corresponding buttons on a consol. All studies began with a short block of three practice
trials, followed by the presentation of the critical trials.
2.1.3. Materials—The critical conditions represented the four cells of 2 × 2 design. The
first factor, polarity, contrasted the positive and negative forms of the quantifier in the
context sentence (some vs. only some). The second factor, repetition, contrasted the
repetition of a previously mentioned referent with the introduction of a new referent in the
critical sentence (girls vs. boys).
Huang and Gordon Page 5













Table 1 illustrates an example of one of the 32 three-sentence critical passages.1 The first
introductory sentence provided background for the up-coming events. The second context
sentence began with a locative expression followed by a definite noun phrase in the subject
position. This NP was always embedded in a quantified expression but the polarity of this
expression varied across positive (“some of the girls”) and negative (“only some of the
girls”) conditions. The predicate of the context sentence remained identical across
conditions (“met with the teacher”). The final critical sentence began with a referring
expression but varied whether it repeated the preceding NP or introduced a new referent. In
the repeated condition, these expressions were embedded in a five- to nine-word sentence
frame that was initially ambiguous between the reference and complement set (“The girls
were studying for the test…”). Nevertheless, to avoid explicit mention of the complement
set, the final phrase always disambiguated these sentences in favor of the reference set (“…
and wanted to ask questions”). In the new condition, referring expressions were derived
from similar categories as the repeated condition and were embedded in the same initial
sentence frame as the repeated condition (“The boys were studying for the test…”).
However, in order to maintain the felicity of introducing a completely different set, the final
phrase contrasted the actions of the new set with those of mentioned in the context sentence
(“…but didn’t want help”).
Potential main effects of nouns (girl vs. boys) were eliminated in two ways. First, the new
referents also served as repeated referents across counterbalancing lists. Four versions of
each base item were used to create eight presentation lists such that each list contained eight
items in each condition and that each base item appeared just once in every list. Second,
within each counterbalancing list, new and repeated referents were matched in average
length (M = 7.37 and M = 7.40 characters respectively, p’s > .90) and written frequency
(Kucera & Francis, 1967; M = 1.36 and M = 1.54 log frequency respectively, p’s > .40).
Across all experiments, critical trials were randomized within four experimental blocks and
intermixed with 16 three-sentence filler passages which did not include quantifiers. Lists of
sample items are provided in the Appendix.
2.2. Results
Eye movements were analyzed using four measures of reading time (see Liversedge,
Paterson, & Pickering, 1998; Rayner, 1998): (1) gaze duration (the sum of fixation durations
on a region of interest from the first time that region is fixated until a region outside the
target region is fixated provided that the eyes have not yet gone beyond that region); (2)
regression-path duration (the sum of all fixation durations from the first fixation in a region
until there is a fixation to the right of that target region); (3) likelihood of regression into a
region (the proportion of saccades to a previous region following a first fixation to a
subsequent region); and (4) re-reading duration (the difference between total reading time
and gaze duration). Gaze durations are typically associated with earlier aspects of language
processing while the remaining three measures are typically associated with later ones
(Rayner, 1998).
2.2.1. Initial reading of quantifier region—To determine whether there were any
differences in the processing of the quantified expressions, we first examined gaze and
regression-path durations in the four-word region from the quantifier to the NP in the
context sentence (“some of the girls”). There were no effects of polarity, repetition, or
interaction between the two (all p’s > .30), demonstrating that initial processing of the
quantified expressions was well matched across conditions. This congruity reduces the
1One item was excluded from analysis due to experimenter error.
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possibility that subsequent effects of polarity or interactions with polarity are driven by overt
strategies or awareness of the manipulation.
2.2.2. Critical expression region—Next we examined the effects of lexical processing
on repeated versus new expressions at the onset of the critical sentence. Following earlier
studies (Ledoux et al., 2007; Traxler et al., 2000; Liversedge et al., 2003; Raney et al.,
2000), we focused on evidence of repetition priming in two measures of reading time on the
critical noun (“girls/boys”) and the following word (“were”). Figure 1 shows that gaze
durations on the critical expression were marginally shorter following a repeated referent
than a new one (257ms vs. 269ms, F1(1,39) = 3.42, p = .07; F2(1,30) = 3.14, p = .09).2 This
difference became significant on the following word (226ms vs. 253ms, F1(1,39) = 9.73, p
< .01; F2(1,30) = 15.91, p < .001). Similarly, Figure 2 shows that regression-path durations
on the critical expression were significantly shorter in the repeated than new condition
(334ms vs. 430ms, F1(1,39) = 8.07, p < .01; F2(1,30) = 10.80, p < .01) though this
difference diminished in the following word (337ms vs. 371ms, p’s > .20).
Importantly, during both the critical expression and the following word, there were no
significant effects of polarity and no interactions between polarity and repetition on gaze and
regression-path durations (all p’s > .30). In fact, contrary to the predicted discourse effects,
reading times following repetition were slightly greater in the positive condition compared
to the negative condition (gaze: 258ms vs. 255ms; regression-path: 360ms vs. 307ms),
though these differences were not significant (all p’s > .15). Altogether these results suggest
that while prior context can rapidly influence lexical processing, it had no impact on early
processing at the discourse level.
2.2.3. Post-critical expression region—We then focused on whether the polarity of
the quantified expression had any measureable influence on the reading of the passage. In
particular, we had predicted that when the repeated expression was preceded by the negative
quantifier, activation of both the reference and complement sets would lead to referential
ambiguity and corresponding delays in processing. We found evidence of this referential
ambiguity in measures of later processing during two regions of interest. First, Figure 2
shows that two words after the critical noun, regression-path durations in the negative-
repetition condition began to exceed those in other conditions. We averaged regression-path
durations during a four-word region corresponding to this delay (“studying for the test”) and
found no main effects of polarity or subsequent reference (all p’s > .20). Critically however,
these two variables did exhibit a significant interaction during this region (F1(1,39) = 4.34, p
< .05; F2(1,30) = 3.06, p = .09). Comparisons within levels of polarity showed no reliable
differences between new and repeated expressions following a positive quantifier (759ms
vs. 806ms, F1(1,39) = 0.64, p > .40; F2(1,30) = 0.28, p > .60). In contrast, when the
quantifier had been negative, times were significantly longer with repeated referents than
with new ones (863ms vs. 696ms, F1(1,39) = 4.01, p = .05; F2(1,30) = 4.33, p < .05).3
However, these increases in regression-path durations coincided with the linguistic
disambiguation of the reference and complement sets among eight critical items. This
2Careful readers (and our Editor) have noticed the gaze duration in the positive-repetition condition was unusually high on the first
word of the critical sentence (“the”). This may have contributed to marginal effects of repetition priming on the critical expression
(“girls/boys”). Closer inspection of the data revealed that gaze durations on the article led to an interaction between repetition and
polarity that was marginal by subjects (F1(1,39) = 3.28, p = .08) but nowhere near significant by items (F2(1,30) = 0.39, p > .50). We
noticed that while participants typically skipped this short word, two subjects inexplicably exhibited very long gaze durations (>
450ms) in this condition. When their data were excluded from analyses on this region, differences across conditions disappeared (all
p’s > .60).
3Power analyses within the negative condition revealed a moderate-sized discourse effect (mean difference = 167ms, λ =.78). Thus if
an effect of this magnitude were present at the onset of the critical expression, it would have been detected with virtual certainty (λ =.
95). This suggests that discourse effects were not simply weaker than lexical effects but were genuinely delayed.
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introduced the possibility that differences in the negative-repetition condition were in fact
driven by readers’ sensitivity to linguistic cues that were consistent with the reference set
among a subset of items. To evaluate this hypothesis, we performed the same analyses
excluding these short ambiguous-frame items. We found that regression-path durations
continued to be higher in the negative-repetition condition (850ms) compared to all other
conditions (negative-new: 656ms, positive-repeated: 689ms, positive-new: 815ms). This led
to a significant interaction between polarity and subsequent reference (F1(1,39) = 5.12, p < .
05; F2(1,22) = 5.85, p < .05), with no additional main effects (all p’s > .50). This suggests
that delays in the discourse processing of referential ambiguity occurred after facilitation in
the lexical processing of repeated expressions.
2.2.4. Re-reading of quantifier region—Finally, re-reading of the region around the
quantified expression was used to further test the possibility that interpretation of the
repeated noun following the negative quantifier reflected reprocessing of the complement
and referent sets. We focused on regressions back to a two-word region around the
quantifier in the context sentence (“lecture…some”) that were triggered by reading of the
region two words following the critical noun (i.e., the earliest point at which polarity effects
emerged in the critical sentence). Figure 3a reveals that the likelihood of regression into a
positive quantifier trended toward being lower following a repeated referent than a new one
(32% vs. 40%), but the likelihood of regression into a negative quantifier was no different
following repeated and new referents (39% vs. 37%). These differences led to a marginal
interaction between polarity and subsequent reference (F1(1,39) = 3.50, p = .06; F2(1,30) =
2.27, p < .15) but no individual main effects (all p’s > .40).
A similar pattern emerged in the corresponding re-reading durations during this two-word
region around the quantifier. Figure 3b reveals that re-reading times around the positive
quantifier were significantly shorter following a repeated referent than the new one (139ms
vs. 184ms, F1(1,39) = 6.22, p < .05; F2(1,30) = 3.30, p = .08). This again indicates that the
mention of repeated referents led to easier re-processing of the quantified expression than
the introduction of new referents. In contrast, re-reading times in the region around the
negative quantifier were longer following the repeated referent than a new one (190ms vs.
138ms, F1(1,39) = 4.92, p < .05; F2(1,30) = 2.68, p = .11). This is consistent with the notion
that there is greater referential ambiguity in these trials. Altogether these differences in re-
reading durations led to critical interaction between polarity and subsequent reference
(F1(1,39) = 8.81, p < .01; F2(1,30) = 5.90, p < .05) but no individual main effects (all p’s > .
70).
2.3. Discussion
In Experiment 1, we examined the influence of a quantified context on subsequent lexical-
and discourse-level processing during real-time language comprehension. Replicating
previous studies (Ledoux et al., 2007; Traxler et al., 2000; Liversedge et al., 2003; Raney et
al., 2000), we found faster reading times for repeated expressions compared to new ones.
The presence of repetition priming at the onset of the repeated word demonstrates that prior
context can rapidly influence lexical processing. However, relative to this benchmark, the
influence of context on discourse processing was very slow, appearing in measures of
regression-path durations two words after the repeated expression and in re-reading of the
quantifier. This pattern supports the distinction between lexical and discourse processing
and suggests that context effects on each of these levels of interpretation unfolds across
discrete moments in time.
Nevertheless, while we interpret the delays in the negative-repetition trials as reflecting the
processing of referential ambiguity triggered by the repeated expression, it is possible that
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they were caused by other sources. One possibility is that only some activated both the
reference- and complement-set representations and that this in turn generated expectations
that the repeated, definite expression would be followed by a postnominal modifier to
distinguish between these two sets (e.g., “the girls that didn’t meet with the teacher”). Thus
the presence of a repeated NP did not itself trigger the processing of the referential
ambiguity; rather it was the absence of a disambiguating modifier two words later. However,
while this is an intriguing hypothesis, it is at odds with a dominant finding in the literature
which consistently shows that definite expressions immediately trigger processing of
referential ambiguity (Sedivy et al, 1999; Grodner et al., 2010; Tanenhaus et al., 1995). For
example, Huang and Snedeker (2009, in press) found that when asked to “Point to the girl
that has some of the socks,” listeners’ eye-movements following the onset of the gender cue
(“the girls”) demonstrated immediate competition between two girls in the scene (a girl with
socks and a girl with soccer balls). This occurred even though the definite expression was
followed by a modifier which unambiguously distinguished between the two referents.
These findings suggest that the repeated expressions in Experiment 1 should have been
sufficient to trigger referential processing. Nevertheless, we will return to this possibility in
our analysis of the results from Experiment 2.
A second alternative explanation for the delayed discourse effects is that only some strongly
evokes the complement set and is only weakly associated with the reference set. Indeed prior
work has found variability in the proportion of set interpretations generated across different
quantifiers (Sanford et al., 1996; Sanford et al., 2007). Consequently, when participants in
the negative condition reached the region two words after the repeated expression (“studying
for the test”), they may have interpreted this phrase as referring to the reference set and were
boggled by the mismatch between what was highlighted by the context sentence and what
was specified by the critical sentence. This suggests that rather than reflecting delays in
global discourse processing, reading times during this region indicated readers’ immediate
sensitivity to an anomalous reference at the local level. Thus like the context effects on
lexical processing, this detection of a mismatch is incrementally time-locked to the onset of
the relevant input. However unlike lexical processing, this input appears two words after the
repeated expression rather than on the expression itself, accounting for its later emergence in
processing.
Yet this account fails to capture other features of the current data. First, if evidence of
discourse processing was triggered by mismatching input, it is unclear why this pattern
should have emerged during a region that was ambiguous between the reference and
complement sets. Recall that the final portion of the critical sentence disambiguated the
referring expression in favor of the reference set but that these later regions were excluded in
a follow-up analysis. Thus there is no evidence that strongly links temporal delays at the
discourse level with any kind of triggering input. Second, re-reading times around the
quantifier provides indirect evidence that only some was not exclusively associated with the
complement set. While new expressions led to longer durations for the positive quantifier,
they actually led to shorter durations for the negative quantifier. It is possible that only some
facilitated processing of new expression by triggering representations of contrast across
various sets, including to other basic level categories (e.g., girls, boys). This is consistent
with linguistic accounts arguing that the presence of the only focus operator highlights
contrast across relevant alternatives (Rooth, 1985; Krifka, 1995).
Nevertheless, our current data does not offer direct insight into whether the activated
contrast includes both the reference- and complement-set representations. Thus in order to
properly interpret the delays found in Experiment 1, we need better evidence about how the
polarity of the expressions of interest focuses elements within the discourse representation.
In Experiment 2, we explicitly test the hypothesis that only some - unlike some - is
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ambiguous between both the reference and complement sets. We did so by modifying the
sentence completion task used by Sanford and colleagues (1996) and presenting participants
with the context sentences from Experiment 1 (Table 2). Our critical dependent measure
examined completion of an anaphoric expression which repeated the definite NP in the
preceding quantified expression. If only some is solely associated with the complement set,
then we should expect the majority of continuations to refer to this quantity. However, if
only some is ambiguous between both the reference and complement sets, then we should
expect continuations to refer to both.
3. Experiment 2
3.1. Methods
3.1.1. Participants—Thirty-six English-speaking undergraduates from the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill participated in this study. They received course credit for their
participation.
3.1.2. Procedure and Materials—Participants sat in front of a computer and saw two-
sentence passages presented using the software program Linger
(http://tedlab.mit.edu/~dr/Linger/). Each trial began with the entire passage and repeated
expression and participants were instructed to “finish this sentence in a way that made sense
given the situation.” A blank space was available under each passage so that participants
could type in their answers.
Table 2 illustrates an example of one of the 32 critical passages which were based directly
on the materials used in Experiment 1. The context sentence varied in the polarity of the
quantified expression while the critical sentence always repeated the definite NP in the prior
expression. Two versions of each base item were used to create two presentation lists such
that each list contained 16 items in each condition and that each base item appeared just
once in every list. The same 16 filler passages used in Experiment 1 were also modified for
the purposes of this task and were randomly intermixed with the critical passages.
3.2. Results
Participants’ continuations were coded as referring to either (1) the reference set (i.e., “…
had questions about the up-coming test”), (2) the complement set (i.e., “…wanted to study
on their own”), or (3) an ambiguous set (i.e., “…loved to go to school”). Responses of the
last type often involved the total set of girls or an irrelevant generic statement. However,
since they were rare (< 3% of all responses) and did not vary across the two polarities, they
were excluded from remaining analyses. Table 3 shows that there were more complement-
set responses following the negative polarity compared to the positive polarity. However,
participants’ responses also indicate that there was a robust preference for the reference set
across both polarities.
To directly compare the ratio of reference- and complement-set responses, we calculated the
preference for the reference set as a difference score of reference-set responses minus
complement-set ones. Comparisons across polarity revealed a greater preference for the
reference set following the positive expression compared to the negative one (F1(1,35) =
119.34, p < .001; F2(1,31) = 45.80, p < .001). We also compared the preference for the
reference set against what would be predicted by chance (in this case, zero). These analyses
confirmed that preference for the reference set exceeded chance following both the positive
(t1(35) = 13.35, p < .01; t2(31) = 11.76, p < .01) and negative polarities (t1(35) = 4.15, p < .
01; t2(31) = 2.61, p < .05).
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Finally, we also coded participants’ responses to examine how often the repeated expression
was continued with a postnominal modifier (e.g., that, which, who). Recall that in our
discussion of Experiment 1, we had introduced the possibility that a preference for this
construction might have led readers to ignore the referential ambiguity at the onset of the
definite NP. Comparisons across polarity revealed more frequent postnominal modification
following the negative quantifier compared to the positive one (M = 38% (SD = 17%) vs. M
= 23% (SD = 17%); F1(1,35) = 56.54, p < .001; F2(1,31) = 34.89, p < .001). This suggests
that participants were aware of the ambiguity following “only some” and made efforts to
explicitly distinguish between the two sets. However, while participants produced more
postnominal modifiers following the negative polarity, this was certainly not the dominant
response. On the remaining 62% of trials, sentences were completed with disambiguating
predicates that were true of either the reference or complement set. This provides additional
evidence against an account where delays in discourse processing were driven by an initial
failure to detect referential ambiguity.
3.3. Discussion
Altogether these results are consistent with prior research demonstrating that negative
polarity expressions highlight the complement set to a greater degree (Sanford et al., 1996;
Moxey, 2006). Sanford and colleagues (1996) found that positive quantifiers were almost
always finished with reference set completions (93% of the time) and never with
complement set completions while negative quantifiers were often finished with
complement set completions (71%) and sometimes with reference set completions (15%).
Our results demonstrate a similar asymmetry where the positive form unequivocally
highlights the reference set while the negative form is more ambiguous between the
reference and complement sets. Furthermore, relative to the other negative quantifiers
examined by Sanford and colleagues (not quite all, not all, less than half, not many, few), we
found that only some was much more likely to generate both types of responses.4 Critically,
with respect to the findings in Experiment 1, these results suggest that following only some,
representations of both the reference set and complement set were available at the onset of a
repeated NP. This suggests that delays in the context effects on discourse processing were
not due to a failure to access these robust representations.
Nevertheless, it is possible that off-line sentence completion measures conflate several
distinct processes including the interpretation of the preceding passage and the production of
the subsequent continuation (Arnold, 2001; Rohde, 2008). Consequently, participants’
responses may provide an accurate assessment of the range of interpretations that are
possible following the quantified expression but a less accurate indication of the ones that
are actually available during online comprehension. In Experiment 3, we the turn to a self-
paced reading task to isolate the discourse representations triggered by the comprehension of
positive and negative quantifiers. We do so by examining how some and only some
influence the reading of congruent and incongruent anaphoric expressions (see Table 4).
Prior evidence has shown that reading times of a complement-set anaphor (the rest) are
shorter following only some compared to some (Breheney et al., 2006). This suggests that
negative polarity highlights representations of the complement set which in turn facilitates
subsequent reading of an anaphor with a matching meaning. Critically, it is unknown how
polarity might influence the processing of a reference-set anaphor (they). One possibility is
that only some highlights the complement set to the exclusion of the reference set. If this
4Because of the goals of our experiment, our materials differed slightly from that of Sanford and colleagues (1996). These
modifications likely account for the larger differences between positive and negative quantifiers in the previous study. Sanford and
colleagues elicited continuations from five sets of positive/negative pairs (rather than focusing on one) and asked for continuations
using “They…” (rather than the repetition of the antecedent NP).
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were the case, then we would expect that following only some compared to some, there
would be faster reading of a congruent complement-set anaphor but slower reading of an
incongruent reference-set anaphor. Another possibility is that only some is truly ambiguous
between the reference and complement set. If this were the case, then we would expect the
same pattern of facilitation following a congruent complement-set anaphor but no difference
across polarities following an equally congruent reference-set anaphor.
4. Experiment 3
4.1. Methods
4.1.1. Participants—Thirty-six English-speaking undergraduates from the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill participated in this study. They received course credit for their
participation.
4.1.2. Procedure and Materials—Participants sat in front of a computer and saw phrase-
by-phrase intervals of passages presented using Linger. Each trial began with a series of
hash marks, indicating the location of the words in the passage. Participants were instructed
to press the space bar to change the hash marks into words for the current phrasal unit. To
prevent re-reading of previous content, the current segment reverted back to hash marks
when the space bar was pressed again and only the words for the next unit segment were
visible. Participants were told to read the sentence at a natural pace. After each passage, they
were presented with a true-false comprehension question and responded by pressing the
appropriate keys.
Table 4 illustrates an example of one of the 32 critical passages which were based directly
on the materials used in Experiment 1. The context sentence again varied in the polarity of
the quantified expression while the critical sentence varied the type of referring expression.
In the reference set condition, a reference-set anaphor was embedded in the same frame as
the critical sentences in the repeated condition of Experiment 1 (“They were studying for the
test | and wanted to ask questions ”). In the complement set condition, a complement-set
anaphor was embedded in the same frame as the critical sentences in the new condition
(“The others were studying for the test | and didn’t want help ”). These sentences were
divided into two regions of interest, one containing the anaphoric expression and a following
region which disambiguated the sets in a way that was consistent with the anaphors. The
preceding content was divided into five phrasal segments, making each passage seven units
long. Four versions of each base item were used to create four presentation lists such that
each list contained eight items in each condition and that each base item appeared just once
in every list. The same 16 filler passages used in Experiment 1 were also divided into
phrasal segments and were randomly intermixed with the critical passages.
4.2. Results and Discussion
Our primary analyses focused on reading times within the sixth region of the passage which
contained the critical anaphoric expressions (“They/The others were studying for the test”).
Additional analyses confirmed that were no main effects or interactions during intervals
immediately prior to and following this critical region (all p’s > .60). Figure 4 illustrates that
the complement-set anaphor was in general read slower than the reference-set anaphor,
leading to a main effect of referring expression (F1(1,35) = 55.42, p < .001; F2(1,31) =
34.15, p < .001). This pattern is consistent with previous studies (Sanford et al., 1996;
Paterson et al., 1998) and suggests that the complement-set expression may be more
complex to interpret relative the referent-set expression; it also may reflect the presence of
an additional word in the complement-set expression as compared to the referent-set
expression. Reading times in the negative condition were also faster during this region
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compared to in the positive condition, leading to a marginal main effect of polarity (F1(1,35)
= 3.06, p = .09; F2(1,31) = 4.63, p < .05).
Critically, these main effects were modulated by the presence of the predicted interaction
between the polarity of the quantified expression and type of subsequent referring
expression (F1(1,35) = 4.68, p < .05; F2(1,31) = 5.83, p < .05). Reading times of the
complement-set anaphor were faster when preceded by a negative quantifier compared to a
positive one (1354ms vs. 1475ms, F1(1,35) = 5.30, p < .05; F2(1,31) = 6.34, p < .05). This is
consistent with patterns in prior studies (Sanford et al., 1996; Paterson et al., 1998; Breheney
et al., 2006) and suggests that complement-set representations were invoked following only
some but not some. In contrast, reading times in the reference-set anaphor were no different
across the two polarities (1144ms vs. 1155ms, F1(1,35) = 0.04, p > .80; F2(1,31) = 0.01, p
> .90), suggesting that reference-set representations were invoked equally by some and only
some. Furthermore, the fact that these patterns emerged in this region suggests that these
discourse representations were available to guide online interpretation at the onset of the
anaphoric expressions.
Altogether the results from Experiments 2 and 3 are consistent with a discourse model
where positive polarity activates only reference-set representations, while negative polarity
activates both reference- and complement-set representations. This asymmetry in the effects
of polarity on discourse representations sheds light on our interpretations of the results from
Experiment 1. In particular, they suggest that the discourse processing of the repeated
expression following a negative context reflects the ambiguous co-reference of multiple
salient sets. This procedure involves the matching of the linguistically-specified content with
the mental model of the language processor (Gordon & Hendrick, 1998). Critically, the
lateness of these context effects relative to those at the lexical level suggests a genuine
temporal division between processing across these representations.
5. General Discussion
This study examined the influence of context on lexical- and discourse-level processing
during real-time language comprehension. Consistent with previous work, we found that
prior recognition of a word facilitates subsequent recognition of that same word later in the
passage (Ledoux et al., 2007; Traxler et al., 2000; Raney et al., 2000; Liversedge et al.,
2003). The overall rapidity of these effects suggests that context can immediately influence
lexical processing. In contrast, the influence of context on discourse processing was very
slow, appearing in measures of regression-path durations two words after the repeated
expression and in re-reading of the quantifier. Altogether our results suggest a robust
temporal division between language processing across these levels of representation.
Methodologically, our study highlights two effective ways to examine the interaction
between lower-level and higher-level representations. First, the presence of repetition
priming provides an informative benchmark for understanding time-course of context
effects. Establishing the onset of lexical processing provides a meaningful lower-bound for
which to compare the onset of discourse processing. Second, the combined use of
quantification and co-reference provides a useful tool for studying discourse representations
since they highlight entities that are sufficiently abstract and not directly tied to the linguistic
input (Moxey & Sanford, 1993, 2000; Sanford et al., 1996; Moxey, 2006; Sanford et al.,
2007; Breheney et al., 2006). This ensures that processing indeed reflects procedures related
to the matching of the linguistically-specified content with the mental model of the language
processor rather than those that could be possibly attributed to lower-level processes.
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Theoretically, our results speak to current debates about the timing of language processing.
On one side are accounts that highlight the rapidity and interactivity of various informational
sources during real-time comprehension (MacDonald et al., 1994; Elman, 2009; Levy, 2008)
while on the other are those that focus on the relative inefficiencies of these processes
(Sanford & Sturt, 2002; Ferreira & Patson, 2007). Our findings suggest a possible solution
for this paradox: While linguistic input is incrementally mapped onto various linked
representations (orthographic/phonological, syntactic/semantic, discourse), these
representations are partially ordered such that processing at one level constrains processing
at other levels. Consequently, we can find evidence of both rapid effects of lower-level
lexical representations in early measures of reading as well as delayed effects of higher-level
discourse representations in later measures. The presence of a robust temporal division
between these procedures is also consistent with prominent models of eye-movement control
during reading such as the EZ reader (Pollatsek et al., 2006). This approach has traditionally
emphasized effects at the lexical level; however, recent attempts have expanded this
framework to account for influences from high-level, post-lexical processes (see Reichle and
colleagues (2009), pg. 5–6 for details on the mechanisms underlying post-lexical integration
during the “I stage” in EZ Reader 10).
The division between processing at the lexical and discourse levels also has important
implications for the interpretation of current empirical data. First, it suggests that context
effects may not always reflect interference from the construction of a fully-developed global
discourse model. With respect to studies that use anomalous sentences (Rayner et al., 2004;
Warren & McConnell, 2007; Warren et al., 2008; Joseph et al., 2008; Filik, 2008), our
results suggest the possibility that rapid context effects instead reveal early sensitivity at a
much lower-level such as the local processing of unexpected lexical items. This alternative
presents challenges for interpreting findings from studies which make inferences about
linguistic architecture based on the reading of anomalous sentences, including those from
the ERP literature (Van Berkum et al., 2003; Van Berkum et al., 2005; Kuperberg et al.,
2003; Hagoort et al., 2004; Nieuwland & van Berkum, 2006).
Second, our results also suggest that by situating representations across multiple levels, one
can make distinctions between effects of language processing that emerge primarily from
top-down prediction of up-coming words and those that result directly from bottom-up
integration of past and current input (Kintch, 2005; Huang & Snedeker, in press). There has
been considerable evidence demonstrating that listeners and readers can reliably anticipate
up-coming linguistic input based on the predictability of previous content or salient features
in the context (Tanenhaus et al., 1995; Altmann & Kamide, 2007; Van Berkum et al., 2005;
Kamide, Altmann, & Haywood, 2003; Pickering & Garrod, 2007; Lau, Stroud, Plesch, &
Phillips, 2006). Very salient entities can enter the discourse model through inference and
may even be implicitly labeled prior to being explicitly mentioned in the linguistic context
(Sharkey & Sharkey, 1987; Huang & Snedeker, in prep). This mapping between an inferred
entity and implicit label may facilitate subsequent processing once the linguistic input is
encountered and result in rapid context effects via discourse representations.
Nevertheless, while top-down procedures may play a critical role during language
comprehension, our current work highlights the importance of bottom-up procedures as
well. In particular, if the previous input does not make obvious a single interpretation, the
relevant discourse entities cannot be represented prior to their linguistic mention. Thus in
order for language comprehension to proceed, the reader must rely on integration of past and
current context to access the meanings of the expressions and build a discourse model of the
event (Garrod & Sanford, 1994; Gordon & Hendrick, 1998). Since these bottom-up
processes are constrained by the ordering of these representations within the linguistic
architecture, aspects of higher-level interpretation in these cases may be delayed relative to
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lower-level ones (Tanenhuas & Lucas, 1987; Morris, 1994; Hess et al., 1995; Warren et al.,
2008; Huang & Snedeker, 2009, in press; Ledoux et al., 2007). Our results suggest that these
distinctions – between lexical versus discourse processes and top-down versus bottom-up
processing – play a crucial role to understanding effects of context during reading.
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Gaze duration during the ambiguous region of the critical sentence. Bars indicate standard
error of the mean. Asterisks indicate the presence of significant effects.
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Regression-path duration during the ambiguous region of the critical sentence. Bars indicate
standard error of the mean. Asterisks indicate the presence of significant effects.
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(A) The likelihood of regressions into the quantifier and (B) re-reading durations of the
quantifier. Bars indicate standard error of the mean.
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Reading times during the reference-set and complement-set anaphor region. Bars indicate
standard error of the mean.
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Table 1
Example of a critical passage in Experiment 1
Introduction sentence There were forty days until the test.
Context sentence
Positive After the lecture, some of the girls met with the teacher.
Negative After the lecture, only some of the girls met with the teacher.
Critical sentence
Repeated The girls were studying for the test and wanted to ask questions.
New The boys were studying for the test but didn’t want help.
Question True or False: No one bothered to prepare for the test.
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Table 2
Example of a critical passage in Experiment 2
Introduction sentence There were forty days until the test.
Context sentence
Positive After the lecture, some of the girls met with the teacher.
Negative After the lecture, only some of the girls met with the teacher.
Critical sentence The girls …
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Table 3
Continuations of the repeated expression across positive and negative polarities
Type of continuation
Reference set Complement set Difference score
Positive polarity 81% (15%) 16% (14%) 64% (29%)
Negative polarity 57% (13%) 40% (13%) 18% (26%)
Note. Parentheses indicate SDs of the means.
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Table 4
Example of a critical passage in Experiment 3
Introduction sentence There were forty days | until the test.
Context sentence
Positive After the lecture, | some of the girls | met with the teacher.
Negative After the lecture, | only some of the girls | met with the teacher.
Critical sentence
Reference They were studying for the test | and wanted to ask questions.
Complement The others were studying for the test | but didn’t want help.
Question True or False: No one bothered to prepare for the test.
Note. The dividing lines indicate the word segments that were presented together.
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Appendix
Sample items for Experiments 1, 2, and 3
1. The meeting involving the entire office was going to be three hours long. Prior to the scheduled time, some (only some) of the secretaries ate
lunch.
 Exp 1 Repeated: The secretaries went to a nearby restaurant so they would not be late.
New: The accountants went to a nearby restaurant but it too crowded to get a seat.
 Exp 2 The secretaries …
 Exp 3 Reference: They went to a nearby restaurant | so they would not be late.
Complement: The others went to a nearby restaurant | but it was too crowded to get a seat.
2. The veterinarian had a busy schedule during the beginning of the week. On that Monday some (only some) of the cats could be seen.
 Exp 1 Repeated: The cats waited patiently in the lobby until their owners were called.
New: The dogs waited patiently in the lobby but their owners were asked to bring them back another day.
 Exp 2 The cats …
 Exp 3 Reference: They waited patiently in the lobby | until their owners were called.
Complement: The others waited patiently in the lobby | but their owners were asked to bring them back another day.
3. The school was planning a fund raiser on a Saturday night. Because it was the weekend some (only some) of the teachers could find the time
to go.
 Exp 1 Repeated: The teachers showed their support by providing free child care during the event.
New: The parents showed their support by donating their money.
 Exp 2 The teachers …
 Exp 3 Reference: They showed their support by | providing free child care during the event.
Complement: The others showed their support by | donating their money.
4. It was three weeks before the annual cross disciplinary debates. Because of their schedules some (only some) of the scientists could attend..
 Exp 1 Repeated: The scientists had prepared intensely but lost the debate.
New: The philosophers had prepared intensely for the next debate.
 Exp 2 The scientists …
 Exp 3 Reference: They had prepared intensely | but lost the debate.
Complement: The others had prepared intensely | for the next debate.
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